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PROJECTING THE IMPACT OF LANNING AND RANSOM:
CALCULATING “PROJECTED DISPOSABLE INCOME” IN
CHAPTER 13 REPAYMENT PLANS
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan∗
In 2005, Congress amended the United States Bankruptcy Code (the
“Code”) through the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (“BAPCPA”).1 In part, these amendments required a formulaic calculation
of the “projected disposable income” a chapter 13 debtor must pay to
unsecured creditors, which is based on the debtor’s prebankruptcy income and
allowed expenditures.2 In consecutive terms, the United States Supreme Court
∗ Associate Dean for Administration & Business Affairs and Professor of Law, Stetson University
College of Law. Prof. Radwan thanks the administration and staff of Stetson University College of Law for
their support and assistance in this project, and her research assistants, Christian Leger, J.D. 2012, and Juan
Jose Diaz Granados, LL.M. 2012, for their research and review of this article.
1 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
2 Section 102(h) of BAPCPA, entitled “Applicability of Means Test to Chapter 13,” amends § 1325(b)
of the Code to define “disposable income”—but not “projected disposable income”—to include:

current monthly income received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care
payments, or disability payments for a dependent child made in accordance with applicable
nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) less
amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—
(A) (i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or for a
domestic support obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the petition is
filed; and
(ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of ‘charitable contribution’
under section 548(d)(3) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as
defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of gross income of
the debtor for the year in which the contributions are made; and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the
continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, § 102(h)(1)–(2), 119 Stat.
23, 33–34. It then goes on to link expenses to the means test of § 707:
Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2) shall be determined in
accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2), if the debtor has current
monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than—
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the
applicable State for 1 earner;
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family
income of the applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or
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considered the effect of changes to a debtor’s income3 and then expenses4 in
calculating a debtor’s projected disposable income within a chapter 13
bankruptcy case.5 While the Court answered some questions about the
calculation of “projected disposable income”—a phrase only partially defined
by the BAPCPA amendments—the Court’s decisions awakened a debate as to
how a debtor may claim expenses in calculating projected disposable income
when, in reality, the debtor incurs only a portion of the allowed expense. In the
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decisions, Ransom v. FIA Card Services,
N.A.6 and Hamilton v. Lanning,7 lower courts have used the opinions to
support conflicting solutions to this dilemma.
The conflicting solutions vary based on how courts define expenses. To
calculate disposable income, which is the funds available to repay creditors, a
debtor must deduct listed expenses. Throughout the Code, phrases such as
“reasonably necessary,”8 “actual,”9 and “applicable”10 modify expenses. In
interpreting these modifiers, two approaches exist for dealing with a debtor
whose actual expenses differ from the Code’s allowed expenses. The “cap”
approach limits the debtor’s expense deductions to the lesser of the actual
amount spent or the standard allowance (as defined by the Code); the
“allowance” approach permits the debtor to take the entire standard allowance
deduction regardless of whether the debtor actually incurs all of that
allowance. Under either approach, if the debtor’s expenses change during the
three- to five- year term of the repayment plan, courts decide whether to adopt
a “step-up” approach that limits a debtor’s ability to claim expenses to only the
time the debtor actually incurs such an expense. The fact that courts have used
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family
income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $525 per month
for each individual in excess of 4.
§ 102(h)(3), 119 Stat. 23, 34.
3 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010).
4 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011). The Court decided both Ransom and
Lanning 8–1, with Justice Scalia dissenting. Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2478
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
5 BAPCPA modified the less structured definition for “disposable income,” but retained the preBAPCPA requirement that the debtor include all “projected disposable income” for payment to unsecured
creditors to confirm a chapter 13 plan. Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2469–70.
6 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011).
7 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3) (2006).
9 See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
10 See id.
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Ransom and Lanning to support a variety of these approaches highlights the
inherent conflict between the two opinions and creates additional issues for the
bankruptcy courts.
This Article considers two issues unresolved by Ransom and Lanning
encountered in calculating projected disposable income: (1) a debtor’s actual
expenses are less than the expense allowance, and (2) a debtor’s expense
terminates during the bankruptcy repayment plan period. After considering the
language of §§ 707(b) and 1325(b), the decisions in Lanning and Ransom, and
the policies espoused by BAPCPA, the Article concludes that a debtor should
only be permitted to deduct the amount of an expense actually used to
determine projected disposable income devoted to repayment of creditors.
I. THE ROLE OF PROJECTED DISPOSABLE INCOME IN A CHAPTER 13
REPAYMENT PLAN
Chapter 13 allows an individual11 debtor to repay creditors through a plan
outlining the timing and amount of payment to each creditor.12 Unlike a
chapter 7 bankruptcy case, in which debtors pay creditor claims from the
liquidation of prepetition assets,13 chapter 13 focuses primarily on the
postpetition earnings14 of the debtor to support the repayment plan. A chapter
13 debtor must propose a plan of repayment within fourteen days of filing the
bankruptcy petition.15 The court then determines whether to confirm the plan.16
Upon confirmation of the plan, the debtor pays the trustee who, in turn, pays
creditors according to the dictates of the repayment plan.17 While the Code
provides several bases for denying plan confirmation,18 Lanning and Ransom
11

Id. § 109(e).
Id. §§ 1322, 1325.
13 These prepetition assets become property of the estate upon entry of the order for relief, which in a
voluntary bankruptcy case occurs upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. §§ 301(b), 541(a).
14 Debtors electing to file under chapter 13 must have regular income in order to support the repayment
plan. Id. § 109(e). In a chapter 13 case, earnings during the bankruptcy plan period are also included as
property of the estate and the debtor maintains possession of these assets except as provided for in the plan. Id.
§ 1306(a)–(b).
15 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).
16 11 U.S.C. §§ 1324, 1325.
17 Id. § 1322(a)(1).
18 See, e.g., id. § 1322(a) (providing basic plan requirements, including providing sufficient resources to
fund the plan, payment in full of priority claimants, and fair treatment of claims within a class.); id. § 1325(a)
(allowing plan confirmation only if it meets a variety of requirements, such as: paying all fees, filing the
bankruptcy petition and proposing the plan in good faith, paying unsecured claimants at least what the
12
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involved denial of confirmation of the plan because the debtors allegedly failed
to include all “projected disposable income” for the payment of unsecured
claims.19
For debtors whose current monthly income20 equals or exceeds the state
median income,21 the Code defines “disposable income” as the difference
between the debtor’s current monthly income and a set of defined expenses
permitted by the Code.22 These expenses fall within the “means test” of
§ 707(b);23 chapter 13 of the Code incorporates them by reference to the means
test.24 A court cannot confirm the debtor’s proposed plan in a chapter 13
bankruptcy case over the objection of a trustee or unsecured creditor if the
claimants would have received in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, allowing secured claimants to retain the
security interest, paying secured claimants in full, proposing a feasible plan, paying domestic support
obligations, and filing tax returns).
19 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724–28 (2011); Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct.
2464, 2469 (2010). Interestingly, in Ransom, the Supreme Court never refers to “projected” disposable
income. Instead, it focuses on how the term “applicable” affects the definition of “disposable income.”
Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724–28. However, the Court’s focus on how “[i]n Chapter 13 proceedings, the means
test provides a formula to calculate a debtor’s disposable income, which the debtor must devote to reimbursing
creditors under a court-approved plan generally lasting from three to five years” provides the necessary
reference to “projected” disposable income within a chapter 13 repayment plan. Id. at 721 (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b)).
20 Current monthly income equals the average of the debtor’s monthly incomes received during the six
months prior to the month of filing the bankruptcy petition. Id. § 101(10A).
21 Debtors whose “current monthly income” annualized exceeds the state median income for a similarlysized household must determine necessary support expenses by reference to “means test” data in § 707(b)(2).
Id. § 1325(b)(3).
22 Id. § 1325(b)(2). These allowed expenses include postpetition domestic support obligations, qualified
charitable deductions, necessary business expenses, and expenses necessary for support of the debtor and his
or her dependents. Id.
23 The means test includes those expenses allowed by the IRS as National or Local Standards; actual,
reasonable, and necessary expenses for certain family or household members; actual expenses of administering
the chapter 13 plan; actual, reasonable, and necessary educational expenses up to a designated amount for
minor children; actual, reasonable, and necessary utility costs in excess of those provided for in the standards;
and payment to secured and priority claimants. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A). Often debt payments fall in part within the
standard expenses, and also fall within the actual expense sections of the means test. See, e.g., In re Meek, 370
B.R. 294, 308–12 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (discussing judicial resolutions of potential “double-dipping”
problem whereby a debtor could deduct certain secured debt under two different means test provisions). For
example, debt owed to a mortgage lender or holder of a purchase money security interest in an automobile
would constitute both a allowed expense under the Local Standards and a secured debt under
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). Courts considering what deductions to allow in such cases generally held that the debtor
could deduct the standard allowance in calculating projected disposable income, but had to reduce that
allowance by the debt payments already deducted as secured debt. In re Meek, 370 B.R. at 311. In essence, the
debtor who actually incurred a mortgage or automobile expense could deduct the greater of the actual secured
debt payment or the IRS allowance in calculating projected disposable income.
24 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3); see also Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 721 n.1.
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debtor fails to include all projected disposable income to fund the plan during
the applicable commitment period.25 But the Code fails to define either
“projected” or “projected disposable income,” leaving open the question of
how the term “projected” modifies the formulaic calculation of disposable
income created by the means test. Fitting §§ 707(b) and 1325(b) together poses
problems because
the definition of “disposable income” set forth in § 1325(b)(2) is
strictly backward-looking in measuring the debtor’s income by virtue
of its reliance on the statutorily defined concept of “current monthly
income.” That which the “best efforts” test of § 1325(b)(1) is trying
to measure (and ensure is going to creditor repayment), though, is the
forward-looking “projected disposable income to be received during”
26
the coming term of the plan.

This natural tension between these Code sections and the Code’s policies of
maximizing creditor repayment,27 minimizing judicial discretion,28 and
ensuring a fresh start for debtors29 reached the Supreme Court in Lanning and
Ransom.
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Hamilton v. Lanning: Changed Income
Lanning involved a debtor whose income rose above her prebankruptcy
income due to a single payment from her former employer, termed a “buyout,” that would not occur again in the future.30 As a result, the debtor’s current
monthly income, calculated according to the Code’s definition, exceeded the

25 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). The applicable commitment period, in turn, equals three or five years,
depending upon whether the debtor’s current monthly income exceeds the state’s median monthly income.
§ 1325(b)(4)(B).
26 Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Adopts the Forward-Looking Approach to Projected Disposable
Income in Chapter 13, 30 BANKR. L. LETTER 2, Aug. 2010, available at Westlaw, 30 No. 8 BLL 2.
27 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 721 (noting BAPCPA’s primary purpose of maximizing creditor repayment).
28 See Mantas Valiunas, Comment, Anything But Automatic: Dismissal under § 521, 28 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 231, 237–38 (2011).
29 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991); see also Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2473–
74 (2010) (noting that while BAPCPA served to maximize recovery for creditors, that purpose must be read in
light of the history of the entire Code).
30 Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2470. While an employer buy-out may not be a frequent occurrence, other
types of one-time payments could occur in the employment context, such as bonuses for promotions or
extraordinary work, or salary adjustments based on equitable considerations.
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income that she would likely receive during the term of the repayment plan.31
While the calculation of disposable income, and thus of projected disposable
income, also includes expenditures, the only dispute in Lanning involved the
income side of the calculation. In calculating projected disposable income, the
debtor omitted the buy-out payment, resulting in a lower income and, thus, a
lower disposable income to be included within the plan’s provisions. The
trustee argued against confirmation of the debtor’s plan because the debtor
failed to include all projected disposable income in the plan—here, the buy-out
was excluded.32 The trustee advocated the mechanical approach, under which
the debtor must include all disposable income into the plan, calculated using
the formula provided by §§ 1325 and 707(b), multiplied by the number of
months of the plan.33 The debtor, arguing for the forward-looking approach,
asserted that the term “projected” allows for postpetition changes from the
formulaic calculation of disposable income.34
The Court rejected the trustee’s suggested method of calculating projected
disposable income by merely multiplying the disposable income over the term
of the bankruptcy plan. The Court considered the ordinary meaning of the term
“projected,” finding that projections include more than simply “assumption[s]
that the past will necessarily repeat itself.”35 The Court noted that because
other places within the Code expressly provide for multiplication, “projected”
must mean something different than simple multiplication.36 The Court also
looked to language within other sections of the Code, noting that the debtor
calculates projected disposable income “as of the effective date of the plan”—
31 Id. The calculation of current monthly income and disposable income uses data provided by the debtor
in Form B22C. The debtor must also file Schedules I and J, indicating the anticipated income and expenses of
the debtor during the bankruptcy case. STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 6I
(12/07), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006I_
1207f.pdf; STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 6J (12/07), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006J_1207f.pdf; STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 22C (12/10), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20Forms%201210/B_22C_1210.pdf.
32 Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2470.
33 Id. at 2470–71.
34 Id. at 2471. The debtor’s income, if calculated using the forward-looking approach, fell below the state
median for a similarly-situated household. Id. at 2470. Such an income calculation could lead to other
consequences, including modifying the debtor’s applicable commitment period for the chapter 13 bankruptcy
plan under § 1325(b)(4), or allowing the debtor to include all amounts necessary for “maintenance and
support” rather than using the expenses allowed within §§ 707, 1325(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1325(b)(3)(A). See supra
Part I; infra Part III.A.
35 Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2471.
36 Id. at 2472.
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implying that the income on that effective date might differ from prepetition
income used for determining projected disposable income.37 Finally, the Court
considered the history of bankruptcy law and the BAPCPA amendments to
conclude that Congress intended some flexibility in calculating disposable
income for the purposes of funding a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.38 Ultimately,
the Court held that projected disposable income allowed for “virtually certain”
changes to income postpetition. However, the Court implied that absent nearcertainty that future income would differ from prepetition “current monthly
income,” a mechanical calculation is still the starting point for determining
projected disposable income.39
B. Ransom v. FIA Card Services: Allowable Expenses
One year after Lanning, the Court addressed the same issue of whether to
apply the formulaic approach, but on the expense side of the projected
disposable income equation. Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A. involved a
debtor who owned a car outright, but sought to deduct the car ownership
expense permitted under the Local Standards referred to by § 707(b).40 As it
did in Lanning, the Court eschewed the formulaic approach in favor of a more
realistic picture of the debtor’s true situation during the chapter 13 bankruptcy
plan repayment period. Specifically, the Court denied the debtor the ability to
deduct anything but car maintenance expenses when the debtor did not make a
loan or lease payment on the car.41
In its analysis, the Court first noted that the Code’s Local Standards follow
the IRS’s Standards42 for taxpayers,43 and that IRS Collection Financial

37

Id. at 2474.
See id. at 2472–74 (explaining that pre-BAPCPA cases teach not to erode past bankruptcy practice
absent a clear congressional intention to do so).
39 See id. at 2475 (“As the Tenth Circuit recognized in this case, a court taking the forward-looking
approach should begin by calculating disposable income, and in most cases, nothing more is required. It is
only in unusual cases that a court may go further and take into account other known or virtually certain
information about the debtor’s future income or expenses.”); see also James Davis-Smith, A Consensus
Emerges on the Projected Disposable Income Test under Lanning: Modified “Disposable Income,” Not Actual
Ability to Pay, 9 NORTON BANKR. L. ADV. 1, Sept. 2011, at text accompanying notes 1–2 available at
Westlaw, 2011 NO. 9 NRTN-BLA 1 (“[C]onsensus seems to be emerging . . . that Lanning’s forward-looking
approach permits only limited adjustments to the ‘disposable income’ calculation on Official Form B22C.”).
40 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2011).
41 Id. at 725–26.
42 See 26 U.S.C. § 7122(d)(2) (2006).
43 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 722 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv)).
38
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Standards tie ownership costs to “monthly loan or lease payments.”44 Thus, to
the extent that the debtor could deduct car ownership expenses, those expenses
require the debtor to make a monthly payment toward ownership costs. In
determining whether a debtor who did not incur such an ownership expense
could nonetheless deduct a car ownership expense, the Court started with the
language of the Code, noting that only “applicable” expenses fall within the
means test calculation.45 Because this debtor did not have any expense
attributable to owning a car, either as a lease or finance payment, the Court
concluded that such an expense did not apply to this debtor.46 The Court
emphasized that this conclusion comports with BAPCPA’s intent to maximize
recovery for creditors in disallowing unnecessary deductions.47
Consistent with Lanning, Ransom rejects the mechanical (or formulaic)
approach for calculating disposable income when determining “projected
disposable income” for a confirmable chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.48
C. Principles from Lanning & Ransom
Read together, these decisions suggest that:
1. The starting point for determining projected disposable income
involves the calculation of current monthly income based on the six

44 Id. However, the Court distinguished the use of the Collection Standards for guidance from the
complete inclusion of the Collection Standards within the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 726 n.7 (“we emphasize
again that the statute does not ‘incorporat[e]’ or otherwise ‘impor[t]’ the IRS’s guidance. . . . The IRS creates
the National and Local Standards referenced in the statute, revises them as it deems necessary, and uses them
every day. The agency might, therefore, have something insightful and persuasive (albeit not controlling) to
say about them.”).
45 Id. at 724 (citing § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)).
46 Id. at 725–26.
47 Id. at 725. See also Christopher W. Frost, Inching Toward Workability: The Supreme Court Adds to Its
BAPCPA Jurisprudence, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER 1, Mar. 2011, at notes 25–26 and accompanying text, available
at Westlaw, 31 No. 3 BLL 1 (“If one understands the use of the means test expenses as an effort to increase
creditor recoveries, those expenses should be interpreted narrowly.”); Ned W. Waxman, Final Score on
“Projected Disposable Income”: Forward-Looking Approach (8), Mechanical Approach (1), 48 HOUS. L.
REV. 315, 348 (2011) (arguing that Lanning correctly applied the forward-looking approach in reaching
BAPCPA’s “goals of preventing bankruptcy abuse, making certain that debtors repay creditors the most that
they can afford, and shifting can-pay debtors from a Chapter 7 liquidation to a Chapter 13 repayment plan.”).
48 Frost, supra note 47, at text accompanying notes 25–26 (“it seems as though the Court may be moving
toward a general understanding of the means test and the test for projected disposable income that incorporates
a significant dose of reality into what may appear to be fairly mechanical tests.”).
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months preceding the petition date, reduced by the expenses permitted
under § 707(b).49
2. A debtor who does not incur any expense in a category may not deduct
that expense.50
3. Known or virtually certain changes from the calculation of disposable
income under § 707(b) may be accounted for in projecting the
disposable income for the term of the plan.51
The Court used the Code’s language to develop each of these three principles.
While the cases combined suggest an approach that lends weight to the
debtor’s economic realities, the Court refused to abandon the formulaic
approach altogether. Instead, the Court attempted to balance the Code’s
formula with a more realistic assessment of a debtor’s financial situation. This
balancing of the congressional intent to create clear rules and reverence to
bankruptcy policies left bankruptcy courts with several unresolved issues.52
III. THE DEBTOR’S ABILITY TO CLAIM THE STANDARD DEDUCTION IF THE
STANDARD DEDUCTION EXCEEDS ACTUAL EXPENSE OR ACTUAL EXPENSE
TERMINATES BEFORE THE END OF THE CHAPTER 13 PLAN PERIOD
The issue of whether a debtor may claim a full deduction under the IRS
National and Local Standards when the debtor incurs an actual expense, but
not the full deduction, arises in two situations. In the first situation, assume that
the Standards grant a debtor a $200 monthly automobile ownership expense
deduction pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).53 If the debtor actually pays only
$180 per month in loan repayment, may the debtor take the full $200 monthly
deduction, or only the $180 actually used? In the other situation, if the debtor
does actually spend $200 per month on a loan payment, but that payment will
end one year into the chapter 13 plan period, can the debtor take the deduction
for the entire length of the bankruptcy plan, or must the disposable income
change upon payment in full of the car loan?
49

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
52 See Frost, supra note 47, at text accompanying notes 47–49 (noting the inherent problem of
BAPCPA’s competing purposes of maximizing creditor recovery and minimizing judicial discretion).
53 Throughout this Article, references to “§ 707(b)(2),” “allowances,” or the “standard deductions” refer
to § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)’s deductions.
50
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Ransom, referring to the IRS’s standards, noted that the ownership expense
deduction reflects the cost of financing the automobile, either through loan or
lease payments.54 The Ransom Court rejected taking a deduction for a nonexistent expense in calculating projected disposable income. However, the
Court declined to determine whether debtors who make some payment toward
a car lease or loan may take the entire standard expense for the entire length of
the plan or must take only the actual amount of the monthly payment for the
actual period in which the debtors make payments in calculating projected
disposable income.
A. Forms Versus Schedules
Upon petitioning for bankruptcy protection, the debtor completes Form
B22C, which includes a calculation of current monthly income based on the six
months preceding the bankruptcy filing date.55 Prior to the enactment of
BAPCPA and its means test, Schedules I and J56 guided the calculation of
projected disposable income.57 These schedules list the debtor’s anticipated
future income and expenditures, respectively.58 Since BAPCPA, the language
of §§ 1325(b) and 707(b)(2) requires calculating disposable income by taking
the information from Form B22C and deducting standard expenses, with little
need to consider the information on Schedules I and J. However, the Lanning
and Ransom decisions suggest that the information on Schedules I and J still
plays a role in determining projected disposable income for chapter 13 plan
confirmation. Furthermore, courts continue to respect bankruptcy practices
prior to enactment of BAPCPA, absent a clear intent to modify those
practices.59

54

Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 725 (2011).
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 22C (12/10), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20Forms%201210/B_22C_1210.pdf.
56 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 6I (12/07), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006I_1207f.pdf; STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORM 6J (12/07), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006J_1207f.pdf
57 In re Egbert, 384 B.R. 818, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008).
58 A debtor also provides other financial information including recent tax returns. 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)–(j)
(2006).
59 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2473 (2010) (“Pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice is telling
because we ‘will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that
Congress intended such a departure.’”) (quoting Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S.
443 (2007); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998)).
55
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In one instance, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon relied on
Lanning to reject a purely mechanical test based on Bankruptcy Form B22C
and allowed debtors to use evidence, including, but not limited to, Schedules I
and J, to modify the mechanical calculation.60 In In re Reed, the debtors
proposed a forty-three-month chapter 13 plan.61 The debtors in this case
needed to calculate one component of disposable income—the current monthly
income—to determine whether they could propose and confirm a plan of less
than sixty months.62 Using Form B22C, the debtors’ current monthly income
would not require a sixty-month plan, but if Schedules I and J controlled, the
debtors’ current monthly income required a sixty-month plan.63 The court

60

In re Reed, 454 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011).
Id. at 796.
62 Id. A debtor whose current monthly income (not projected disposable income) equals or exceeds the
state median income for a similarly-situated household must propose a sixty-month plan. § 1325(b)(3)–(4).
However, a circuit split exists regarding the length of the plan for a debtor whose current monthly income
exceeds the state median, but who has no projected disposable income to pay to unsecured creditors. Compare
Whaley v. Tennyson (In re Tennyson), 611 F.3d 873 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the applicable commitment
period is inconsequential when disposable income is negative), with Baud v. Carroll, 43 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.
2011) (concluding that the debtor must propose a sixty-month plan despite the lack of projected disposable
income), and Timothy v. Anderson (In re Timothy), 442 B.R. 28 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010) (same). See also
Maney v. Kagenveama (In re Kagenveama), 541 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2008) (pre-Lanning case using the
“multiplier” approach to determine that a debtor with no projected disposable income need not propose a fiveyear plan of repayment if secured and priority claims can be paid in shorter time period). While the Court in
Lanning criticized Kagenveama, Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2475, courts continue to consider what impact
Kagenveama has in determining how to calculate projected disposable income. See Danielson v. Flores (In re
Flores), 692 F.3d 1021, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2012) (deciding that Lanning did not overrule Kagenveama, on the
issue of determining applicable commitment period); In re Henderson, 455 B.R. 203, 208 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2011) (“Because the Supreme Court adopted the forward-looking approach, as opposed to the Kagenveama
favored mechanical approach, Kagenveama’s instructions to bankruptcy courts for calculating debtors’
projected disposable income were effectively overruled. But, contrary to Trustee’s suggestion, it is clear the
Lanning decision did not directly address the other issue resolved in Kagenveama: whether § 1325(b)(1)(B)
requires an above-median-income debtor with no projected disposable income to make payments to debtors
over the applicable commitment period.”).
63 In re Reed, 454 B.R. at 794. Reed involved the calculation of disposable income, in the context of
determining the “applicable commitment period” for a chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Reed court recognized that
“[t]he questions of how to project disposable income and what ‘applicable commitment period’ is used when
an above-median debtor has zero or negative projected disposable income have vexed debtors, trustees, and the
courts since amendment of the statutory definition of ‘disposable income.’” Id. at 795. To the extent that the
debtor has projected disposable income in excess of the state median for a similarly situated household, the
debtor has a five-year “applicable commitment period”—thus requiring the debtor to have a sixty-month-long
repayment plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii). A debtor whose projected disposable income is less than the
state median does not face the same requirement. Id. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(i). The debtors in Reed sought to
establish a projected disposable income of less than the state median, which would in turn allow them the
shorter repayment plan; the trustee argued that the debtors’ income exceeded the state median and, thus, their
61
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rejected a purely mechanical test based upon Form B22C, but did not see the
schedules as the only other option.64 Rather, the court noted that Form B22C
remains the starting point for determining current monthly income. The party
wishing to modify that calculation65 bears the burden of showing that such a
calculation fails to reflect the debtor’s postpetition financial situation.
Schedules I and J may rebut the presumptions of the formulaic approach, but
the schedules are “not sufficient alone to allow deviation from the Form B22C
disposable income in calculating projected disposable income.”66 The party
seeking to modify the calculation must show, per Lanning, certainty of those
changes regardless of what the schedules anticipate as future income or
expenses.67 As the Reed court noted, this approach creates a burden-shift,
rather than a bright line rule that focuses entirely on the Schedules I and J or
Form B22C.68 Such a burden-shifting approach ensures that the standard
deductions provide the starting point for determining projected disposable
income. It also allows parties to demonstrate a need for modification when the
Standard Expenses do not apply because a debtor does not incur any expense
in a category, or when the income or actual expenditures change in such a way
that the Form B22C does not accurately reflect the debtor’s financial situation.
It also furthers the policy of limiting judicial discretion only to those situations
in which a debtor or trustee can demonstrate a need to vary the income or
actual expenditures—balancing creditor recovery and debtor fresh start.
forty-three-month plan of repayment failed to meet the Code requirements for the length of the plan. In re
Reed, 454 B.R. at 795.
64 Id. at 796–97.
65 While in Reed the trustee sought to use Schedules I and J to calculate projected disposable income and
the debtor sought to use the form and standard allowances for the calculation, the parties seeking to modify the
form with the schedules might flip in other situations. Id. at 795. For an example of a situation in which the
debtor sought to use the schedules to reduce projected disposable income because the Form B22C income
included artificially inflated figures for income, see Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2471 (2010). For an
example of a situation which would rebut the presumption of the form/standard approach, focusing particularly
on Lanning-type examples, see In re Reed, 454 B.R. at 797.
66 Id. at 797–98.
67 Id. at 798.
68 Id. at 796–97. The court explained how the burden will shift between the parties in making a
determination of projected disposable income:
When the trustee seeks to rebut the presumption that the monthly disposable income shown in the
Form B22C accurately reflects a debtor’s projected disposable income, the trustee bears the
initial burden to present evidence that the amounts used in the form do not adequately predict the
debtor’s disposable income into the future. . . . However, once the trustee makes an initial
showing, debtors as proponents of the plan have the burden to show that the plan complies with
all of the requirements for confirmation. Id. at 796.
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B. Statutory Language
Sections 1325(b) and 707(b)(2) provide the parameters for determining a
debtor’s disposable income in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case. Combining these
sections, disposable income equals current monthly income minus the debtor’s
reasonably necessary expenses, which “shall” include applicable national and
local standards and other actual and necessary expenses.69
Section 707(b)(2) of the Code provides:
The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and
Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the
69

Section 1325(b) mandates that:
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the
plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan—
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not
less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in
the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under
the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term “disposable income” means current monthly income
received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care payments, or disability
payments for a dependent child made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the
extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) less amounts reasonably necessary to
be expended—
(A) (i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or for a
domestic support obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the petition is filed;
and
(ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of “charitable contribution” under
section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as defined in
section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for
the year in which the contributions are made; and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the
continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
(3) Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2), other than subparagraph
(A)(ii) of paragraph (2), shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
section 707(b)(2), if the debtor has current monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the
applicable State for 1 earner;
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family
income of the applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family
income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $625 per month
for each individual in excess of 4.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3) (2006) (footnote omitted).
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categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the
Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor
70
resides . . . .

While Ransom helps tailor the definition of disposable income by noting that
“applicable” refers to an expense that the debtor actually has incurred,71 there
remains uncertainty in defining the parameters of the disposable income of a
debtor who incurs some expense, but not the full National or Local Standard
expense amount for the length of the plan. As Ransom noted, the term
“applicable” does not itself mean “actual.”72 But can the Ransom holding be
extended to mean that the modifiers “reasonable” and “necessary” indicate that
the debtor cannot deduct more than the debtor actually uses? Or does the term
“shall” indicate that the debtor may use the entire amount of the allowance as a
deduction?
C. The Allowance Approach
Courts that adopt the allowance approach permit the debtor to deduct the
full amount of any standard deduction, even if the debtor actually spends less
than the allowed expense. In the consolidated case, In re Scott, the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Illinois allowed debtors to deduct the entire
allowance despite actually incurring less than the allowance. The Scott court
allowed the debtors to deduct the full amount of the automobile expenses
permitted by the Local Standards even though the debtors actually spent less
than the allowance amounts.73 In its analysis, the court focused on statutory
construction. In particular, the court noted that § 707(b) divided means test
deductions into “actual” expenses and “standard” deductions. Because the
automobile expenses fell within the standard deductions of the means test,
whether the debtor actually uses the entire expense does not matter.74 In so
deciding, the court found that neither Lanning nor Ransom interpreted the
Code in a way that changed this analysis.75 Ransom deemed a car expense
inappropriate on the basis that a debtor who incurs no expense does not have
an applicable expense. The Ransom Court declined to extend the term

70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added).
Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2011).
Id. at 727.
In re Scott, 457 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2011).
Id. at 746.
Id. at 746, 748 (citing In re Barrett, 371 B.R. 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007)).
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“applicable” to modify the amount of the allowance for a debtor who incurs an
applicable expense in the category.76
The Scott court’s approach follows the canon of statutory construction that
requires meaning be given to every word within a statute.77 The Supreme Court
used the same canon of construction in Ransom, when it considered the use of
the term “applicable” versus “actual.”78 If Congress intended § 707(b) to limit
a debtor to using only the amount of the expense that the debtor actually
incurred, such expenses would fall within the actual expenses79 rather than in
the applicable standard expenses. Although the Scott court did not consider
Ransom as determinative in making its decision, Scott comports with Ransom
because Ransom was decided based on the term “applicable.”80 Combining the
Ransom and Scott courts’ analyses of statutory construction, “applicable”
refers to whether the debtor incurs an expense, and “actual” refers to the
amount of the expense used by the debtor. Thus, the statutory construction of
§ 707(b)(2) suggests that as long as a debtor incurs an expense in the standard
expense category, the debtor can deduct the entire standard expense in
calculating disposable income.
While the Scott court determined that Ransom did not address the issue
before the court,81 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico reached
the same conclusion as Scott, but found that Ransom dictated such a result.82 In
In re Miranda, the debtor did not include annual Christmas bonuses in
calculating income.83 The debtor also deducted all standard expenses in
76

See Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724; infra text accompanying notes 104–06.
3A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 70:6 (7th
ed. 2008) (citing In re Tennyson, 611 F.3d 873 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Ennis, 558 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2009); In
re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2008); Miller v. U.S., 363 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2004); Schlossberg v.
Barney, 380 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2004)).
78 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724.
79 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II)–(IV) (2006) (allowing actual expense deductions for medical care,
administration of the estate, and educational expenses). Each of the actual expense provisions notes that the
deductible expenses may include actual expenditures for the appropriate category. The standard deductions
include different language, stating that “[t]he debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual
monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue
Service for the area in which the debtor resides.”). Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added).
80 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724.
81 In re Scott, 457 B.R. at 746.
82 In re Miranda, 449 B.R. 182, 191–93 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2011).
83 The debtors received annual Christmas bonuses of approximately $2,000 per year, but argued that the
bonuses were not part of income during the six months prior to the bankruptcy filing date. Id. at 186–87.
77
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calculating projected disposable income, even though the debtor’s actual
expenses were less than the standard expense allowance.84 Citing Lanning, the
court held that the debtor must include Christmas bonuses that the debtor
would likely receive during the chapter 13 commitment period because such
bonuses were virtually certain based on the debtor’s past experience.85 But
while the facts clearly fit within the Lanning precedent on the income side, the
facts did not mirror the Ransom facts on the expense side. Nevertheless, the
court allowed the standard deduction of expenses beyond the debtor’s actual
expenses, citing Ransom and other cases in noting that Congress passed
BAPCPA in part to ensure “uniform application of a bright-line test, which
was more important than accuracy and which limited judicial discretion.”86
Both the Miranda and Scott courts adopted an allowance approach for
standard deductions. While the Miranda court did so based on Ransom, the
Scott court chose a statutory construction approach that consistently read
§ 707(b)(2) with the Ransom court’s reading of it.
D. The Cap Approach
Courts that adopt the cap approach limit the debtor’s deductions to the
lesser of the standard deduction and the actual expense incurred by the debtor.
While the Scott court focused on the statutory distinction between actual and
standard expenses,87 another court’s focus on § 1325(b)’s requirement of
“reasonably necessary” expenses led it to adopt the cap approach. In re
McGillis88 preceded Lanning and Ransom, but neither of these Supreme Court
decisions disturb its reasoning. In McGillis, the debtor’s calculation of
projected disposable income based on § 707(b)’s allowed deductions netted
just $140 per month of disposable income; using the debtor’s actual expenses

Because the debtors filed for bankruptcy in January and had presumably received the latest bonus in the six
months prior to the petition date, the court noted that the bonus should have been included under a mechanical
approach calculation of projected disposable income. Id. The court then noted that even if the bonus had not
actually been received in the six months prepetition, the debtors still would have been required to include it in
their projected disposable income calculation. Id. at 190.
84 Id. at 185.
85 Id. at 190.
86 Id. at 191–92, 194.
87 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses may include, if
applicable, the continuation of actual expenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary for care
and support” of certain relatives and household members).
88 In re McGillis, 370 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007).
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increased projected disposable income to over $1,500 per month.89 In its
analysis of the phrase “reasonably necessary,” the court noted that the only
addition that Congress made was to require that the necessity “be determined
in accordance with . . . section 707(b)(2).”90 The McGillis court concluded that
the reference to § 707(b)(2) merely provided guidance as to which expenses
constitute “reasonably necessary” expenses, not to the amounts that fall within
the categories of reasonable and necessary.91 After determining which
expenses qualify as reasonably necessary expenses, the amount of those
expenses is determined not by the statute, but by the actual use of those
expenses. If the debtor’s actual use exceeds the allowance, only the allowance
amount qualifies as a reasonably necessary expense. But if the actual use is
less than the allowance, only the amount actually used is reasonably necessary
for the debtor.92
E. Limitations of Plain Meaning
Three different courts interpreted the same language of the Code—two
post-Ransom and one pre-Ransom—to reach very different conclusions.93 The
Miranda court’s express reliance on Ransom to support the allowance
approach is misguided because the Ransom Court looked at the definition of
the term “applicable” and found that it referred only to:
an expense [that] is appropriate, relevant, suitable, or fit. . . . A debtor
may claim a deduction from a National or Local Standard
table . . . only if that deduction is appropriate for him. And a
deduction is so appropriate only if the debtor has costs corresponding
to the category covered by the table—that is, only if the debtor will
94
incur that kind of expense during the life of the plan.

Nowhere in that language does the Court discuss the amount of the deduction,
except when the amount actually used is zero.

89

Id. at 727. While part of the difference came from allowances exceeding actual expenses, some of the
difference was also attributable to debts that existed prepetition but would receive no distribution in a chapter
13 bankruptcy case. Id.
90 Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
91 See id.
92 Id. at 730.
93 See In re Scott, 457 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2011); In re Miranda, 449 B.R. 182 (Bankr. D.P.R.
2011); In re McGillis, 370 B.R. 720; supra Parts III.C.–D.
94 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011).
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The Scott and McGillis opinions highlight the difficulty of a plain
interpretation of §§ 1325(b) and 707(b)(2). The McGillis decision interprets
“reasonably necessary” to include a requirement of “actual” expenses.95 As the
Scott court noted, however, including the requirement of actual expenses takes
meaning away from the term “actual” used in other sections of the Code. To
the extent that Congress wrote part of the statute to reflect a particular idea,
Congress would have used the same language to reach the same result
elsewhere in the statute.96 In the very section referred to in determining the
allowed deductions—§ 707(b)—Congress referred to several expenses in
which the debtor may take the lesser of a stated cap and the debtor’s actual
expenses. This suggests that if Congress intended such an interpretation of the
standard expense allowances in § 707(b)(2), Congress would have used the
same language to effectuate that intent.97
Scott correctly noted that interpreting § 707(b)(2)’s language to include an
actual expenditure requirement for standard expenses would negate the
meaning of the term “actual” elsewhere in that specific Code section.98 Further,
§ 707(b)(2)’s use of mandatory language suggests that, after determining the
applicable and actual expenses, those expenses shall be the debtor’s expenses
for purposes of the means test.99 The term “shall” connotes a requirement of
use.100 But the Scott approach fails to consider that the limitation on use of the
full deductions when a debtor actually expends less than the deduction comes
not from § 707(b)(2), but instead from § 1325’s “reasonably necessary”

95

In re McGillis, 370 B.R. at 730.
2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 77, § 46.6 (“courts do not construe different terms within a statute to
embody the same meaning”).
97 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2006) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses may include the
actual expenses for each dependent child less than 18 years of age, not to exceed $1,775 per year per child, to
attend a private or public elementary or secondary school if the debtor provides documentation of such
expenses and a detailed explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary, and why such
expenses are not already accounted for in the National Standards, Local Standards, or Other Necessary
Expenses”) (footnote omitted).
98 In re Scott, 547 B.R. at 745.
99 Id.
100 See In re Owens, 221 B.R. 199, 200–01 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1998) (noting that while the term “shall”
generally connotes a requirement, the court may utilize its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to waive
such a requirement when the requirement fails to further the goals of the Code). The court agreed with the
debtor’s argument that an exception to the requirement that a debtor attend a creditor’s meeting could be
justified in some cases, but determined that this particular debtor’s need to care for an ill family member did
not warrant such an exception. See id. at 201.
96
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limitation on a debtor’s expenditures in calculating projected disposable
income.
The phrase “reasonably necessary” differs from the term “actual,”
explaining why Congress would use different terms in different contexts. A
debtor can actually incur unreasonable or unnecessary expenses. Because the
amount of an expense never actually incurred cannot constitute a necessary
expense, the term “reasonably necessary” subsumes the word “actual.” But the
use of the broader term “reasonably necessary” in § 1325(b) does not render
the use of the more narrow term “actual” in § 707(b)(2) superfluous in all
situations because § 707(b)(2) applies to chapter 7 cases where § 1325(b)’s
“reasonably necessary” qualification will not apply.101
With clear statutory language, interpreting the statute requires nothing more
than applying that clear language.102 But when there is an ambiguous statute,
clear language that contravenes clear legislative intent, or clear language that
creates an absurd result, courts may consider extrinsic evidence in determining
the meaning of the statutory language.103 To be considered ambiguous, the
language of the statute must support two or more reasonable interpretations.104
The terms “reasonably necessary,” “shall,” “applicable,” and “actual” create
sufficient ambiguity in interpreting §§ 707(b) and 1325(b) because they
101 11 U.S.C. § 103(a), (b), (i) (providing that provisions of chapter 7 apply only to cases filed under
chapter 7 absent an express indication otherwise, and that provisions of chapter 13 apply only to cases filed
under chapter 13). An individual debtor seeking to file a chapter 7 case must meet the means test standard.
Because the means test does not itself include a “reasonably necessary” requirement for all expenses,
removing the word “actual” from § 707(b) might allow a debtor subject to the means test to deduct several
expenses the debtor never actually incurs. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (“debtor’s monthly expenses shall be
the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards,
and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by
the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides”) (emphasis added); id.
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses may include the actual administrative expenses of
administering a chapter 13 plan for the district in which the debtor resides, up to an amount of 10 percent of
the projected plan payments”) (emphasis added); id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses
may include the actual expenses for each dependent child less than 18 years of age, not to exceed $1,775 per
year per child, to attend a private or public elementary or secondary school”) (emphasis added); id.
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V) (“the debtor’s monthly expenses may include an allowance for housing and utilities, in
excess of the allowance specified by the Local Standards for housing and utilities issued by the Internal
Revenue Service, based on the actual expenses for home energy costs”) (emphasis added).
102 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (explaining that when the words of a statute
are unambiguous, the cardinal canon requires a court begin by examining the language of the statute and that is
also the last step of judicial inquiry); 2A SUTHERLAND supra note 77, § 46.1.
103 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 77, § 45.2.
104 Id.
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provide several alternative and reasonable interpretations of apparently
contradictory language. Thus, courts can consider extrinsic sources of guidance
in assigning meaning to these provisions.
F. The Precedential Impact of Lanning & Ransom on Deductible Expense
Calculation
1. Debtors Whose Expenses End During the Bankruptcy Plan Period
In dicta, the Ransom Court noted that its ruling might allow a “troubling
anomaly” where a debtor could take the full ownership deduction for the entire
length of the bankruptcy plan by simply having a few car payments remaining
at the time of confirmation.105 But the Court allowed such an anomaly because
“Congress chose to tolerate the occasional peculiarity that a brighter-line test
produces.”106 This language suggests that if the Court had decided the issue, it
would have allowed the full standard deduction for the entire length of the
plan, even if the debtor did not actually make payments toward ownership of
the vehicle during the full length of the plan.107 The policy of maximizing
creditor recovery promoted by both the Lanning and Ransom decisions and the
realistic approach that both cases use suggest that a debtor should only deduct
expenses for the time period that the expenses will actually be incurred by the
debtor.
In 2012, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii considered
whether joint debtors in a chapter 13 case needed to step-up their disposable
income upon payment in full of an automobile expense.108 The court, held that
105

Ransom v. FIA Card Servs. N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 729 (2011).
Id. Unfortunately, this opinion also leads to some ethical quandaries for a debtor’s counsel. As one
observer noted, “[t]he advice that most easily flows from the lips of debtor’s attorneys is this: Go buy a new or
used vehicle prior to filing. If the debtor has an older vehicle, it is better to buy the vehicle now when the
debtor is more likely to be approved for credit and may receive a more favorable interest rate to boot.” Brian
Rookard, Vehicle Planning Decision Challenges After Ransom and Lanning, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J., May
2011, at 72, 72. Such advice violates the spirit of BAPCPA, which added a provision prohibiting debtor’s
counsel from advising a client to incur additional debt on the eve of a bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4)
(prohibiting “debt relief agency” from advising client “to incur more debt in contemplation of such person
filing a [bankruptcy] case”); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324,
1332 (holding that attorneys qualify as debt relief agencies).
107 By contrast, some commentators suggest that Ransom will lead courts to follow the minority approach
of “capping” a debtor’s expenses at the lesser of the allowance or the actual expense based on the realistic
approach rather than on the Court’s dicta. WILLIAM C. HILLMAN & MARGARET M. CROUCH, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE: PLI BANKRUPTCY DESKBOOK § 13:3.4 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2012).
108 In re Montiho, 466 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2012).
106
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an expense lacks applicability after a debtor makes the final car payment,
guided by Ransom’s reliance upon applicable expenses.109 The court also
considered Lanning, noting that the debtor should account for substantially
certain changes in a chapter 13 repayment plan and the calculation of
disposable income.110
The issue of step-up in disposable income upon satisfaction of a prepetition
obligation exists outside of the automobile repayment scenario, and existed
prior to the Lanning decision. Several courts have considered the issue in the
context of calculating projected disposable income when a debtor completes
repayments on a 401(k) loan and have determined that once a debtor completes
repayment of a 401(k) loan, the debtor must step up disposable income and
resulting payments to other creditors under the plan, due to the debtor’s
foreseeable increase in disposable income.111
Despite the Ransom Court’s dicta indicating that Congress envisioned
allowing a debtor to take the full car ownership deduction during the entire
plan term, even if a peculiar result arose, courts addressing the issue should
hold that a debtor cannot take the car ownership deduction once the debtor
completes payments on the actual ownership expense.112 To hold otherwise
109

Id. at 541–42 (citing Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 728).
Id. The court rejected the debtors’ argument for modification of the plan as a more appropriate option,
but did not altogether foreclose the option for debtors who would pay the automobile ownership expense for a
substantial portion of the plan period. Id. at 541 (stating a three month maturity on an auto loan is not enough).
Prior to Lanning, courts adopted a more mechanical approach to calculating projected disposable income and
denied step up payments. See e.g., In re Williams, 394 B.R. 550 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008) (utilizing the
mechanical approach to calculating projected disposable income prior to Lanning, and thus denying any need
to step up payments following repayment of secured car debt); In re McLain, 378 B.R. 39 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
2007) (same); In re Charles, 375 B.R. 338 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007) (same); In re Barrett, 371 B.R. 855 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 2007) (same); see also In re Hughey, 380 B.R. 102 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (denying requirement of
step-up, but expressly rejecting the mechanical calculation used by other courts).
111 Burden v. Seafort (In re Seafort), 437 B.R. 204, 211–13 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2010) (citing Hamilton v.
Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010)); see also In re Nowlin, 576 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2009); McCarthy v. Lasowski
(In re Lasowski), 575 F.3d 815, 817–19 (8th Cir. 2009). Several bankruptcy courts require step-up plans by
debtors who complete repayments on 401(k) loans. See, e.g., In re Brann, 457 B.R. 738, 739 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
2011); In re McCullers, 451 B.R. 498, 501–02 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Cleaver, 426 B.R. 390 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 2010). Such loans can present other unique issues involving the definition of property of the estate and
the protection of retirement funds. See, e.g., In re Egan, 458 B.R. 836, 849–50 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting
the conflicting BAPCPA policies of maximizing creditor recovery and protecting debtor’s retirement
contributions in rejecting trustee’s argument that failure to increase plan payments after repayment to 401(k)
plan in order to increase contributions to plan constitutes bad faith).
112 The termination of the car payments and the resulting increase in projected disposable income could be
reflected in the plan at confirmation or, potentially, as a modification to the already confirmed repayment plan.
However, at least one circuit court determined that modification of a confirmed plan requires a “substantial
110
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would contravene the Lanning ruling that allows modifications to the
disposable income calculation to the extent that those modifications involve
substantially certain changes to the calculation. While the Ransom Court did
not specifically so hold, the Court focused on the term “applicable” in
determining the meaning of “disposable income”—a concept measured as of
the petition date.113 But the meaning of “disposable income” does not present
an issue when the debtor actually has a car ownership payment at
commencement of the plan because the disposable income as calculated by the
Ransom Court accurately reflected the debtor’s reality as of the petition and
confirmation dates.
The meaning of “projected” and how that term affects the calculation of
disposable income presents the real issue in the 401(k) loan payoff scenario.
Because the term “projected” modifies “disposable income,” not just
“income,”114 and disposable income includes both income and expenses,115
Lanning’s interpretation allowing for modifications to the calculation of
disposable income based on substantially certain changes during the plan term
applies equally to changes in expenses and income. Few changes are as
substantially certain as the termination of loan payments pursuant to a contract
between the debtor and the lender. Thus, just as the income in Lanning would
certainly decline during the plan period, the car ownership expense will
certainly terminate during the bankruptcy plan and debtors must account for
these changes under that analysis.
Modifying the calculation of disposable income to reflect the termination of
payments complies with Ransom’s precedent. The Ransom Court’s holding
focused on applicable expenses and noted a debtor who is not actually paying
toward the ownership of the vehicle uses no applicable ownership expense.116
and unanticipated change” in the debtor’s circumstances, because to modify on the basis of known variances
violates principles of res judicata. Murphy v. O’Donnell (In re Murphy), 474 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2007).
Thus, trustees in the Fourth Circuit cannot seek a modification to reflect greater disposable income when car
payments terminated because the end of the car payments would be anticipated prior to confirmation. But see
In re Matson, 468 B.R. 361, 368 (9th Cir. 2012) (each determining that modification does not require
unanticipated changes); Meza v. Truman (In re Meza), 467 F.3d 874 (5th Cir. 2006) (same); Barbosa v.
Soloman, 235 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); In re Witkowski, 16 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Ledford v.
Brown (In re Brown), 219 B.R. 191 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (same); In re Than, 215 B.R. 430 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1997) (same).
113 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that Ransom never uses term “projected”).
114 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2479 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006).
116 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724–26 (2011).
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“Applicable” expenses as of the petition date, included in the disposable
income calculation, may change during the term of the bankruptcy plan. To
determine applicability only as of the date of the bankruptcy petition would
return to the formulaic, multiplier-based approach that the Court rejected in
both Lanning and Ransom because it would take the situation as of that date
and simply allow it to continue throughout the term of the plan unchanged.
Allowing modification of projected disposable income to account for
substantially certain changes also addresses the concern of a debtor who paid
for a car in full prepetition but needs to purchase a new automobile during the
bankruptcy plan.117 If the need for a new car appears with a strong degree of
certainty as of the confirmation date, payments on that new car fall within the
virtually certain changes under the Lanning analysis.118 To the extent that no
such certainty exists, modification of the chapter 13 plan to account for post
confirmation changes in circumstances provides an alternative remedy.119
Courts also face another scenario where prepetition payments to a creditor
will not be paid during the entire length of the repayment plan. While the
scenario discussed above involves the termination of the contractual repayment
term, debtors may also terminate payments during a chapter 13 bankruptcy by
choosing to surrender collateral to the secured creditor. Prior to the Lanning
and Ransom decisions, courts frequently held that debtors could deduct a
payment to a secured creditor to reduce projected disposable income even if
the creditor received nothing in the chapter 13 plan.120 The Sixth Circuit Court
117 See Brief of National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011) (No. 09-907), 2010 WL 2662747 at *25–
26; Oral Argument at 10:06, Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011) (No. 09-907), at 35–37,
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-907.pdf (discussion
between Justice Elena Kagan and attorney Deanne E. Maynard for Respondent); David M. Serafin,
Ramifications of U.S. Supreme Court’s Ransom Decision for Colorado Bankruptcy Filers,
DAVIDSERAFINLAW.COM (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.davidserafinlaw.com/lawyer-attorney-1711958.html
(arguing that most debtors who have paid for a car in full prepetition will need to purchase a new car during
five-year plan, and those that are most harmed by the Ransom decision).
118 Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2478 (requiring substantial certainty of changes as of confirmation of plan).
119 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (2006).
120 See, e.g., Lynch v. Haenke (In re Lynch), 395 B.R. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (allowing debtor deduction
for mortgage payments despite intent to surrender property); In re Burbank, 401 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2009)
(same); In re Marshall, 407 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (allowing debtor full deduction for mortgage
payments despite intent to strip junior mortgage lien); In re Anderson, 383 B.R. 699, 706 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2008), abrogated by Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2478, as recognized in In re McDonald, 437 B.R. 278, 291 n.14
(S.D. Ohio 2010) (allowing the deduction despite surrender of property is the majority rule); In re Hayes, 376
B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (allowing the debtor to use a deduction for surrendered property because
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of Appeals and the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, each relying on
Lanning, held that the virtual certainty that the debtor would not make
mortgage payments after surrendering real property to the mortgage holder
meant that the debtor could exclude such payments to reduce projected
disposable income.121 Since the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Ransom,122
which the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed, at least one bankruptcy court
has denied mortgage expense deductions from projected disposable income for
surrendered property.123 Though this scenario differs from the termination of
car payment cases because the debtor rids himself or herself of the expense at
confirmation of the plan rather than at completion of the debt obligation,
Lanning’s focus on the change from the debtor’s prepetition reality and
postpetition reality suggests that debtors whose expenses change during the
plan period should likewise reduce their projected disposable income to reflect
that change.124
2. Debtors Whose Standard Allowances Exceed Actual Expenses
The Ransom Court also expressly declined to address the issue of how to
calculate a payment that falls below the allowance provided by the IRS
standards:
The parties and the Solicitor General as amicus curiae dispute the
proper deduction for a debtor who has expenses that are lower than
the amounts listed in the Local Standards. Ransom argues that a
debtor may claim the specified expense amount in full regardless of
his out-of-pocket costs. . . . The Government concurs with this view,
provided (as we require) that a debtor has some expense relating to
the deduction. . . . FIA, relying on the IRS’s practice, contends to the

payments to the creditor were not due until discharge of debt). But see Hildebrand v. Thomas (In re Thomas),
395 B.R. 914 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (disallowing deduction for surrendered property); In re Long, 390 B.R.
581, 589–90 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008) (denying debtor deduction for car payments once property was
surrendered); In re Holmes, 395 B.R. 149 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (disallowing deduction for lien-stripped
property).
121 Darrohn v. Hildebrand (In re Darrohn), 615 F.3d 470, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2010); Zeman v. Liehr (In re
Liehr), 439 B.R. 179, 184–86 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2010); see also In re Blaies, 436 B.R. 35 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(denying debtor’s use of mortgage expenses for a second lien stripping under a chapter 13 plan); DeHart v.
Smith (In re Smith), 438 B.R. 69 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010) (same); In re Grant, 423 B.R. 320 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
2010) (same).
122 Ransom v. MBNA, Am. Bank, N.A. (In re Ransom), 577 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom.
Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 723.
123 In re Amidon, 423 B.R. 546 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010).
124 See, e.g., Baud v. Carroll, 634 F.2d 327, 349 (6th Cir. 2011).
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contrary that a debtor may claim only his actual expenditures in this
circumstance. . . . We decline to resolve this issue. Because Ransom
incurs no ownership expense at all, the car-ownership allowance is
not applicable to him in the first instance. Ransom is therefore not
125
entitled to a deduction under either approach.

Prior to Lanning, the majority of courts considering what to do when a debtor’s
actual expense fell below the standard allowance used the “allowance
approach,”126 which allowed the debtor to deduct the full amount of the
expense in calculating projected disposable income.127 Both the trustee and
debtor supported such an interpretation of the Code. However, a minority of
courts used the alternative “cap” approach,128 allowing the debtor to use the
lesser of either the allowance or the actual amount of the debtor’s applicable
expense in that category.129 Taking the Ransom and Lanning cases together, a
few clear principles emerge:
1. The starting point for determining projected disposable income
involves the calculation of current monthly income based on the sixmonths preceding the petition date, reduced by the expenses permitted
under § 707(b).
2. A debtor who does not incur any expense in a category may not deduct
that expense.
3. Known or virtually certain changes from the calculation of disposable
income under § 707(b) may be accounted for in projecting the
disposable income for the term of the plan.130
While Ransom did not address the issue, the allowance approach that permits a
debtor to take the full standard deduction for the length of the plan highlights
125

Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 727 n.8.
See supra Part III.C.
127 HILLMAN & CROUCH, supra note 107, § 13:3.4; see, e.g., Musselman v. eCast Settlement Corp., 394
B.R. 801 (E.D.N.C. 2008); In re Pearl, 394 B.R. 309 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Egbert, 384 B.R. 818
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008); In re Phillips, 382 B.R. 153 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2007); In re Morgan, 374 B.R. 353 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); In re Chamberlain, 369 B.R. 519
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007); In re Barrett, 371 B.R. 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Haley, 354 B.R. 340 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006).
128 See supra Part III.D
129 In re Rezentes, 368 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2007); see also In re Egbert, 384 B.R. 818, 828 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 2008) (citing only In re Rezentes for the cap approach, but noting that at least five other courts have
used the allowance approach).
130 See supra Part II.A.
126
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potential tension between the Lanning and Ransom cases.131 The conflict arises
because Lanning allows modification of the formulaic disposable income
calculation to account for “virtually certain” changes to the debtor’s
calculation.
The Lanning Court did not specifically address the definition of the term
“changes,” and courts differ as to whether to limit Lanning to changes in the
debtor’s financial situation from prepetition to postpetition, or to include
changes that occur during the postpetition repayment period.132 Changes
interpreted broadly could include any situation in which the debtor’s formulaic
131

While the Lanning and Ransom decisions at first glance seem to agree, because both reject a purely
formulaic approach for calculating projected disposable income, there is potential inconsistency between the
decisions:
the Lanning Court’s rejection of the inference drawn by mechanical approach proponents, that
Congress sought to eliminate judicial discretion in the determination of a debtor’s projected
disposable income, could produce outcomes at odds with Ransom. An exercise of discretion
could arguably permit a bankruptcy court to allow an expense not incurred by a debtor if she
could show a known or virtually certain, substantial change to her expenses, such as, e.g., a
virtually certain need, during the plan period, to replace a high mileage, aging
vehicle. . . . Lanning afforded the Court the opportunity to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of
either forcing a debtor to propose an unfeasible plan or permitting her to deny easily affordable
repayments to creditors. In contrast, Ransom forced the Court to make a choice: either prohibit a
“fictitious expense” that the debtor does not pay or deny creditors repayment on the strength of
statutory language that eschews a debtor’s financial reality. It chose the former.
Gilbert B. Weisman & William A. McNeal, Projected Disposable Income Captures the Attention of the
Supreme Court—Twice!, 4 NORTON BANKR. L. ADV. 1, Apr. 2011, at text accompanying notes 107–11,
available at Westlaw, 2011 NO. 4 NRTN-BLA 1.
132 The Scott court applied changes narrowly, only considering modifications from prepetition to
postpetition expenditures. In re Scott, 457 B.R. 740, 748 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2011). In Miranda, the court used
the fact that the debtor received bonuses regularly—clearly not a change from pre- to post-petition—to
establish the need to include the additional income. In re Miranda, 449 B.R. 182, 185, 190, 196 (Bankr. D.P.R.
2011). Similarly, debtors who happen to file a bankruptcy petition shortly after receiving an annual bonus
might have an artificially high income, while debtors who happen to file a bankruptcy petition shortly before
receiving an annual bonus might have an artificially low income. But the debtor’s pre- and postpetition
situation has not changed substantially in that the debtor holds the same position at the same pay scale. In re
Reed, 454 B.R. 790, 798 (Bankr. D. Oregon 2011) (“Because there is no change in [debtor’s] income, but only
different calculations depending on what period of time is used, the trustee has not established a known or
virtually certain change in [debtor’s] income that should be used to adjust debtors' disposable income
calculation”). Even Lanning did not involve a change for the debtor, but instead a reflection of the problem
that arises as a result of a formulaic calculation of income. The debtor in Lanning did not change jobs, and her
regular income did not change between pre- to postpetition. Rather, the calculated current monthly income
failed to accurately reflect the income that she regularly received because it happened to include a one-time
payment. Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2470 (2010). However, because the debtor’s one-time
payment would clearly not recur in the future, the Lanning scenario presents more of a change than the
Miranda scenario. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
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calculation of disposable income does not reflect reality postpetition, or
interpreted narrowly, could require that a debtor’s income or expenses
postpetition differ in any way from income or expenses prepetition. For
example, if a debtor earns an annual bonus of $10,000 in the six months
prepetition, a narrow construction of changes would not allow the debtor to
reduce the formulaic calculation of current monthly income because nothing
would change for the debtor postpetition—the debtor received a salary plus
$10,000 annual bonus prepetition and a salary plus $10,000 annual bonus
postpetition. Under a broad construction of changes, the debtor could reduce
current monthly income to reflect the reality that the debtor does not actually
receive a $10,000 bonus every six months as the calculation suggests.
3. Combining the Allowance and Cap Approaches with Lanning’s Change
Analysis
On the expense side of the projected disposable income equation, four
possibilities exist for combining the allowance versus cap approach and the
narrow versus broad interpretations of change:
1. the allowance-approach-plus-broad-interpretation combination: the
debtor may take the full deduction for standard allowances and change
is interpreted broadly to consider any deviation from the debtor’s
financial reality in calculating projected disposable income;
2. the allowance-approach-plus-narrow-interpretation combination: the
debtor may take the full deduction for standard allowances and change
is interpreted narrowly to consider only changes in debtor’s postpetition
financial reality from debtor’s prepetition situation in calculating
projected disposable income;
3. the cap-approach-plus-broad-interpretation combination: the debtor
may use the lesser of the amount actually used in expenses or the
standard allowance and change is interpreted broadly to consider any
deviation from the debtor’s financial reality in calculating projected
disposable income; or
4. the cap-approach-plus-narrow-interpretation combination: the debtor
may use the lesser of the amount actually used in expenses or the
standard allowance, and change is interpreted narrowly to consider only
changes in debtor’s postpetition financial reality from debtor’s
prepetition situation in calculating projected disposable income.
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The allowance-approach-plus-broad-interpretation fails in its application
because, if the debtor is permitted to take the full deduction under the
allowance approach, the fact that the debtor does not, in reality, need the full
deduction does not matter. For example, if a debtor’s automobile expense
allowance is $200 per month, but she only expends $180 per month, the broad
interpretation of change would recognize that the debtor’s use does not match
the allowance, but the allowance approach ignores that very fact.
The allowance plus-narrow-interpretation fares only slightly better than the
allowance approach plus broad interpretation, but still creates a potential
difficulty. On the one hand, the approach suggests that changes to the debtor’s
financial situation do not matter because the calculation of disposable income
never considered the debtor’s financial situation in the first place.
Alternatively, taken to the extreme, the allowance-approach-plus-narrowinterpretation combination could mean that a debtor who historically incurred
$100 in monthly car expenses, but whose monthly allowance totaled $500,
could take the entire $500 allowance for the life of the plan. However, if the
debtor’s monthly car expenses doubled postpetition, the change in debtor’s
circumstances would reduce the amount that the debtor could deduct to $200
per month. Such an “anomaly”133 but it creates an odd result that borders upon
absurdity.134 While Lanning did not expressly consider how changed expenses
would modify projected disposable income, an allowance approach would
necessarily defeat Lanning’s holding allowing virtually certain changes to
modify projected disposable income as to standard deductions regardless of
how courts interpret the term “change.”
Conversely, either of the cap approaches to defining “change” works under
Lanning because the cap approach starts with the debtor’s actual financial
situation. The only question becomes how to define “change” to modify that
calculation—the same question that arises on the income side of the projected

133 See supra text accompanying notes 105–07 (discussing Ransom’s description, in dicta, of the
anomaly).
134 And, while the cap approach might prevent some unusual results, the Ransom dicta noted that a
“bright-line rule” might have some unfortunate consequences, such as allowing a debtor with just a few car
payments to use the deduction throughout the bankruptcy case. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct.
716, 729 (2011). If the Ransom Court had favored a broad interpretation of change and thus permitted
modifications of the standard allowances to reflect actual expenses, no such consequences would have existed
because the debtor’s actual use would limit the hypothetical debtor’s car payment allowance.
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disposable income equation.135 Use of the cap approach also supports use of
the step-up doctrine.136 The step-up doctrine suggests that when a debtor’s
actual expense terminates, the debtor must increase the disposable income
attributable to the repayment of creditors. At the time that an expense
terminates, there is a cognizable postpetition change in the debtor’s expenses
that causes the expense to be zero—certainly less than the allowance amount.
As a result, the cap approach also requires application of the step-up doctrine
when the debtor no longer pays a certain expense.
The cap approach meets the stated purposes of BAPCPA137 and avoids the
odd result of capping expenses for some debtors who do not use the full
allowance because of a postpetition change in circumstances, but allows the
full expense for other debtors whose circumstances do not change postpetition.
However, Lanning may apply only to changes that occur prepetition. For
calculating current monthly income, the debtor’s actual income serves as the
starting point. Likewise, for those expenses that are not within the
allowances,138 the debtor’s incurring of the expense becomes the starting point.
The cap approach meets the stated purposes of BAPCPA139 and avoids the odd
result of capping expenses for some but not all debtors who do not use the full
allowance in the event of narrowly defined changed circumstances. However,
Lanning may apply only to changes that occur prepetition. For calculating
current monthly income, the debtor’s actual income serves as the starting point.
Likewise, for those expenses that are not within the allowances140 Lanning
supports this interpretation, noting that “projected”—the term at the heart of
the opinion—recognizes that historical calculations might not repeat
themselves.141 When those calculations focus not on the debtor’s historical
income but upon IRS standards, no concern exists regarding whether the
debtor’s historical numbers remain unchanged. Lanning also focused on the
135 Under either a narrow or broad interpretation of the term “changes,” a debtor who incurs an actual
expense that equals or exceeds the standard deduction, but whose expense will terminate during the period of
the repayment plan could be required to step up the amount of disposable income once the expense
disappeared. Not only does the continued deduction of the no longer applicable expense fail to reflect the
debtor’s true situation, but it also represents a difference from the debtor’s prepetition situation.
136 See supra Part III.F.1.
137 See Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725; Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2472–74.
138 For example, a debtor must actually incur private school tuition expenses to deduct that expense. 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(IV) (2006).
139 See Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725; Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2472–74.
140 For example, a debtor must actually incur private school tuition expenses to deduct that expense. 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(IV).
141 Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2467.

RADWAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

88

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

1/14/2013 1:38 PM

[Vol. 29

use of the formulaic calculation as simply a starting point and specifically
noted that at least some expenses could be modified to reflect a more realistic
situation.142
Thus, the Lanning decision provides little, and potentially conflicting,
guidance as to whether it applies to standard deductions; the Ransom
decision’s statement regarding the allowance approach is mere dicta and not
binding. This leaves both the statutes and the two Supreme Court cases
interpreting the statutes lending little guidance in the ultimate resolution on
whether the cap or allowance approach applies for a debtor with an actual
expense of less than the IRS standard allowance.
G. BAPCPA’s Policy of Creditor Protection
The policy considerations of both the Code and BAPCPA weigh in favor of
limiting the debtor’s use of the standard allowance to the actual amounts
needed and to the actual time period needed by the debtor.143 The Ransom
Court highlighted one clear policy of BAPCPA—maximization of creditor
recovery—by determining that a debtor may not deduct any expense in a
standard deduction category if the debtor does not actually incur an expense.
Some commentators have suggested that the Court’s emphasis on maximizing
recovery for creditors signifies that, given the opportunity, the Supreme Court
would choose the cap approach in dealing with under utilization of standard
allowances.144 Limiting deductions to the lesser of actual or standard expenses

142

Id. at 2475.
Arguably, some debtors may need a new car in order to promote the fresh start. However, a debtor
with a paid-in-full car needs a new car for the fresh start more than a debtor still making car payments when
bankruptcy begins because the latter debtor likely owns a newer car than the former debtor. See supra note 117
and accompanying text. If the Ransom Court accepted that denial of the automobile expense deduction did not
unduly impede the debtor’s fresh start when the debtor completed car ownership payments before filing for
bankruptcy protection, it should not unduly impede the debtor’s fresh start to have the deduction terminate
when the expense terminates postpetition.
144 W. HOMER DRAKE ET AL., CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 9F:34, 1258 (2011-2 ed., 2011)
(“Although the Ransom Court expressly declined to decide whether the ‘allowance with payment’ or ‘cap’
interpretations governs when the debtor’s payment is lower than the amount the Transportation Standard
permits, its rationale provides support for adoption of the ‘cap’ approach, which limits the deduction to the
actual amount of the debtor’s payment.”) (footnote omitted); Anne Benton Hucker, Note, Do I Own This Car?:
The Supreme Court Creates a Standard for BAPCPA Car Ownership, 76 MO. L. REV. 1239, 1256 (2011)
(concluding that courts will likely use Ransom and the IRS standards to limit debtors to actual use, while
arguing that BAPCPA’s poor drafting led to an incorrect decision). But see Davis-Smith, supra note 39, at text
accompanying notes 52–57 (“the fact that the [Ransom] Court decided a case concerning the details of the
143
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and requiring debtors to increase projected disposable income upon completion
of expense payments would further the policy of maximizing creditor recovery
because it would necessarily increase the disposable income available for the
plan.
However, while these approaches serve to maximize creditor recovery,
BAPCPA and the remainder of the Code offer countervailing policies that
favor a debtor’s use of the full standard allowance for the entire term of the
bankruptcy plan, regardless of actual need. In particular, BAPCPA serves to
minimize judicial discretion and provide certainty for both creditors and the
debtor in determining the assets that will be available for distribution to
creditors.145 To some extent, these approaches involve the discretion of the
court, albeit only to the extent that a trustee or creditor provides evidence that
the debtor actually spends less than the allowance in the standards or that the
debtor will not need the allowance for the life of the plan. But these approaches
have only a minimal effect on the amount of judicial discretion—certainly no
more than the ability to modify income that the Supreme Court allowed in
Lanning. The Code also furthers the policy of protecting the debtor’s fresh
start. Neither the cap approach nor the step-up approach would harm the
debtor’s fresh start because neither prevents the debtor from taking the expense
needed to effectuate that fresh start. If the debtor actually spends only $300,
the cap approach will reduce the expense to $300, but that amount should
suffice to further the debtor’s fresh start. Likewise, if the debtor’s actual
expense ends one year into the plan, the step-up approach gives the debtor the
benefit of having the allowance when the debtor actually needs it. In fact, the
most significant harm to the fresh start would come to the debtor whose actual
expenses exceed the allowance—but that limitation on the fresh start applies
under any approach.146 For example, if the debtor incurs an $800 per month
statutory ‘disposable income’ formula suggests that the Court did not view Lanning as having replaced the
statutory formula with an actual-ability-to-pay test.”).
145 Musselman v. eCast Settlement Corp., 394 B.R. 801, 812 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (“in enacting BAPCPA,
Congress had more than one policy goal in mind. Beyond ensuring greater payouts by Chapter 13 debtors to
their creditors, Congress, in its amendments to § 1325(b), also sought to impose objective standards on
Chapter 13 determinations, thereby removing a degree of judicial flexibility in bankruptcy proceedings”).
146 Courts uniformly forbid the debtor from including expenses in excess of the allowance amounts. See In
re Thiel, 446 B.R. 434 (D. Idaho 2011) (denying chapter 13 debtors’ request to exceed allowed transportation
expenses, and rejecting argument that Lanning and Ransom allow such modification); In re Prestwood, 451
B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2011) (denying chapter 13 debtors’ request to exceed allowed expenses). Even
though the Lanning Court refers to modifications to projected disposable income based upon “virtually certain
information about the debtor’s future income or expenses.” Frost, supra note 47, at text accompanying note 31
(quoting Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2475) (emphasis added). Thus, the cap approach lacks consistency because it
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automobile ownership expense, but a standard allowance of only $500, all
approaches limit the debtor to the $500 expense in calculating projected
disposable income. Thus, neither the cap nor the step-up approaches diminish
the debtor’s ability to enjoy a fresh start.
CONCLUSION: RECONCILING STATUTORY LANGUAGE, PRECEDENT, AND
POLICY
Reconciling statutory interpretation, precedent, and policy in determining a
debtor’s ability to deduct expenses in calculating projected disposable income
presents difficulties to bankruptcy courts. An approach that limits the debtor’s
use of standard allowances to the debtor’s actual need and terminates the use of
standard allowances upon full payment of relevant debt furthers the policy
objective of maximizing creditor recovery. The cap and step-up approaches
follow Lanning by allowing modifications of expenses when the disposable
income formula fails to reflect the debtor’s postpetition reality. The allowance
approach follows the canons of statutory construction and Ransom’s
interpretation of the term “applicable.” The allowance approach allows
modifications to the disposable income formula only in cases with an actual
change to the debtor’s circumstances pre- and postpetition that serve as the
basis for the calculation of projected disposable income
Ultimately, the statutory language and Supreme Court precedents fail to
provide clear guidance on the “cap” versus “allowance” approach for debtors
who use less than the standard allowance amounts. Lanning and Ransom do
suggest that the step-up approach should apply when payments terminate
during the plan period. For the cap versus allowance approach debate, policy
favors the cap approach because it maximizes recovery for the creditors
without unduly impacting the debtor’s fresh start. Together, the cap and stepup approaches create an “actual use” approach that furthers policy and
reconciles the Supreme Court precedents regarding the calculation of projected
disposable income.

allows a creditor or trustee to decrease deductions to reflect reality, but fails to allow the debtor to increase
deductions to reflect reality.

